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1. 
On the Meaning of the Preponderance Test
(l) in Judicial Regulation of Chemical Hazard 
I, Introduction 
ABSTRACT In his Economic Analysis of 1m!_(2) Posner suggests that the 
As usually defined, the preponderance test is a standard of proof 
which directs the jury to accept the plaintiff's version of the 
disputed facts if they are more probably true than not, But what 
happens when the most important disputed "facts" are judgments about 
probability? This paper offers an interpretation of the preponderance 
test which can be applied to this situation, 
In the example of the paper, B is the benefit of a drug, C is the 
health cost if it is a teratogen, and p is the probability of 
teratogenicity, The contested "fact" is the magnitude of p, the 
probability of harm, In the interpretation considered by the paper, 
the jury finds in favor of the plaintiff if the jury decides that it 
is more likely than not that p is greater than B/C, This definition 
of the preponderance test does not quite minimize expected costs, and 
compared with expected cost minimization it is likely to be biased 
toward under-protection when the health costs are high compared with 
the benefits, But when the mean and median of the second order 
probability of p are the same, the definition coincides with expected 
cost minimization, It is also shown that under a criterion of 
expected cost minimization, contrary to Posner, judicial error costs 
are not in general the same and the number of erroneous judgments 
favoring undeserving plaintiffs is not likely to be the same as the 
number of erroneous judgments favoring undeserving defendants, 
criterion of economic efficiency provides a basis for burden of proof 
rules, and in particular a basis for the preponderance test, This 
paper also examines the preponderance test in light of the criterion of 
economic efficiency, but with results that differ from Posner's in some 
ways, The example and focus, in this paper, is on the appropriate 
control of chemical hazards; or more precisely the design of burden of 
proof rules with appropriate incentives, stemming from past decisions, 
for future precautionary controls in similar cases, The analysis is 
sufficiently general to apply to other rules besides the preponderance 
test, such as clear and convincing evidence, and beyond a reasonable 
doubt, and, of course, to apply to other problems besides chemicals, 
For the paper, we assume that general regulatory frameworks 
judicial, legislative, or administrative � are in place, and that 
their chief purpose is to maximize the social benefits, or minimize the 
social costs, of the substance or activity under consideration as a 
candidate for regulation, In any given case, cost-minimization might 
dictate doing nothing--not finding liability or leaving (say) a 
chemical unregulated because its benefits exceed its costs, and what 
(l) This research was supported by the National Science Founda­
tion and the Mellon Foundation, The paper owes much to Jim 
Krier, who generously contributed much of the first two sections, 
(2) R, Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 432 (2nd ed,) 
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costs there are could only be avoided at undue expense; it might call 
for finding liability or for regulating the chemical in some way and to 
some degree, because a carefully designed regulation will yield 
benefits net of regulatory costs; it might command that the chemical be 
banned, because it has no benefits, or because its benefits are smaller 
than adverse effects that could be avoided only by foregoing use of the 
chemical, 
There is no great difficulty in choosing among these 
alternatives if all relevant costs and benefits are known; there is 
considerable difficulty, however, if they are not, And in the case of 
chemical hazards and related risks, benefits and especially costs are 
typically uncertain, For example, we might be pretty sure of the 
direct costs of manufacturing and of controlling a given chemical, of 
the good things the chemical £.fill do for us, and of the probability that 
it will do those things, On the other hand, we will commonly be unsure 
of the range of possible adverse effects the chemical might entail, and 
of the probability that any of those effects will in fact occur, Hence 
subjective judgments about uncertainty are necessary, and our chief 
concern here is the rules--of burden of proof-- by which they should be 
made, He explore some implications of a simple criterion--that burden 
of proof rules should be designed to minimize the expected costs of the 
decision process, We shall focus most closely on the costs of error, 
the undesirable consequences that result when regulatory objectives 
fail to be met. If error costs are to be kept to a minimum, it follows 
that the standard of proof must vary with the hazards in question, 
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While this is not a novel proposition, its implications for a wide 
range of contemporary problems�of which synthetic chemicals are a good 
example�have received little attention, 
II, The Conventional and Economic Wisdom 
He shall begin by considering judicial regulation of hazards 
through such substantive common law rules as strict liability, 
negligence, and nuisance, He start with the courts and the common law 
not because these are the best institutions for controlling the 
problems we have in mind�probably they are not--but because it is in 
judicial common law decisions (and the literature about them) that one 
finds the most explicit and canonical recognition of various burden of 
proof rules, 
Suppose first a substantive standard of strict liability on the 
part of producers of a certain chemical for any injuries the chemical 
happens to cause. For our purposes, strict liability means liability 
whether or not the producer is careless, In other words, the fact that 
measures to reduce the hazards of the chemical (including foregoing its 
production) would cost more than the increased safety resulting from 
the measures is irrelevant; (3) if the chemical did in fact cause the 
injury, its producer is accountable. 
Turn now from a strict liability regime to a regime based on 
negligence (or on related substantive doctrines, such as nuisance, that 
()) Irrelevant for the particular case, but under an economic ef­
ficiency approach these costs are relevant to the decision wheth­
er to impose a strict liability or a negligence rule in similar 
cases, 
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incorporate a standard of reasonableness) , On one view, an economic 
one, negligence, nuisance, and other rules of reason are designed to 
promote cost-minimization. Judge Learned Hand's definition of 
negligence, set out in United States .l!.• Carroll Towing Co. , C4> 
illustrates the proposition: negligence exists where the cost of an 
accident, multiplied by the probability of the accident occurring, 
exceeds the cost of measures the injurer could have taken to avoid the 
accident, Thie version of the negligence standard aims to minimize 
costs by deterring activities in all those cases (but only those cases) 
where the activities give rise to expected costs larger than the costs 
of avoidance, 
Just as we said in our earlier discussion that there is no 
great difficulty in choosing an efficient decision if all relevant 
costs and benefits are known, so too there is no great difficulty in 
applying a strict liability or negligence or nuisance standard if one 
knows the relevant facts, In the case of strict liability, this means 
knowing that an injury occurred, knowing that the defendant's activity 
caused it, and knowing what damage resulted, In the case of 
negligence, it means knowing, in. addition, the defendant's avoidance 
cost, the cost of injuries of the sort threatened by the defendant's 
activity, and the probability that the threat will be realized. 
Typically, of course, some or all of these elements are contested 
(uncertain) , such that the trier of fact must, based on the evidence 
presented, make a guess as to the true state of affairs, But these 
(4) 159 F 2d 169 (2d Cir 1947) 
5 
guesses are not made in the abstract; burden of proof standards 
establish and allocate the risk of uncertainty by determining who wins 
if the factfinder is undecided, and by determining what "undecided" 
means (a judge may find evidence convincing if the applicable standard 
of conviction is low, but unconvincing if it is high) , In ordinary 
civil cases like those we have been discussing, the plaintiff bears the 
burden of persuasion (that is, the risk of indecision is allocated to 
him) , and carries it only if he can convince the factfinder that hie 
version of the facts is supported by a preponderance of evidence, Thie 
is generally taken to mean that the plaintiff must show that the 
assertions on which hie case turns are more likely true than not, 
The traditional interpretation of this standard in a strict 
liability regime is that the plaintiff must convince the court that the 
probability that the defendant's activity caused the plaintiff's 
injury, and to the extent of $X, is more than 50 percent, If it does 
not, the preponderance test implies that the plaintiff loses, The 
negligence case is more complicated, partly because one has to deal 
with probabilities of probabilities, According to the Hand formula, 
negligence liability turns on a comparison of the defendant's avoidance 
cost to the expected cost of an accident, To make out a case, then, 
the plaintiff must in principle prove not only all the "facts" required 
under strict liability (identity of the injurer, cause and effect 
relationship, extent of injury) , but also the additional "facts" 
regarding defendant's avoidance cost, the cost of an accident of the 
sort threatened, and the probability that such an accident would result 
from the defendant's operations, The preponderance test requires that 
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the plaintiff's evidence must convince the factfinder that the expected 
accident cost is sufficiently high, relative to the defendant's 
avoidance cost, to establish negligence, This does .!!.Q!. mean that the 
probability of an accident must exceed 50 percent, Suppose, for 
example, that the plaintiff proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, 
that the defendant engaged in an operation that injured the plaintiff, 
that defendant's avoidance cost was $1000, and that the gravity of the 
threatened harm was $5000, To win his case (contributory negligence 
aside), the plaintiff must also convince the judge that the probability 
of injury exceeded 20 percent without the defendant's precautionary 
actions and so the expected accident cost would exceed the defendant's 
avoidance cost, One possible interpretation of the preponderance test 
is that "convince" here means to show that a greater than 20 percent 
probability is more likely true than not, and the plaintiff wins if the 
factfinder concludes from the evidence that the probability that the 20 
percent figure is 11true11 or "accurate" or a "fact" exceeds 50 percent. 
We take the foregoing to represent the conventional wisdom--to 
the extent there is agreement on a conventional view at all-- regarding 
the burden of proof (more particularly, the burden of persuasion) in 
ordinary civil litigation, Thus, a standard treatise on evidence 
states that in such cases--a suit in tort for personal injuries, say--
"the party who has the burden of pleading a fact will have the burdens 
of producing evidence and of persuading the jury of its existence as 
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well.11 (5) The party carries the burden of persuasion of a fact by 
proving it "'by a preponderance of evidence,' 11 which by its ''most 
acceptable meaning,,,seems to be proof which leads the jury to find 
that the existence of the contested fact is more probable than its 
nonexistence •11<6) On this conventional view, then, "a lawsuit is 
essentially a search for probabilities, A margin of error must be 
anticipated in any such search, Mistakes will be made and in a civil 
case a mistaken judgment for the plaintiff is no worse than a mistaken 
judgment for the defendant,11 (7) 
There is a marked congruity between the foregoing and Posner's 
view regarding burden of proof, In his treatise Economic Analysis .2!.
1fil!., Posner considers 
(A) 
(B) 
(D) 
the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard that 
{ governs civil cases, This standard directs the 
trier of facts to find in favor of the party who 
has the burden of proof on an issue if that 
party's version of the disputed facts is more 
probably true than the other party's version; 
thus, to prevail, the party bearing the burden 
of proof need only establish the validity of 
his claim by a probability infinitesimally 
! greater than 50 percent, This implies that of 
cases decided erroneously, about half will be 
won by undeserving plaintiffs and about half 
lost by deserving plaintiffs, Whether this 
{
result is economically sound depends on whether 
the costs of each type of error--in favor of 
<5> McCormick's Handbook of the Law of Evidence 
ed, E. Cleary ed. 1972) 
337 at 785 (2d 
(6) Id, 339 at 793, 794. This definition of the preponderance 
test will be referred to as "point A" below. 
<7> Id. 341 at 798, The claim that the costs of the two errors 
are the same will be referred to as "point C11 below, 
(C) 
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{ undeserving plaintiffs, and against deserving 
plaintiffs-are about the same; and in general 
it would seem that they are the same,(8) 
As the last line of this quotation suggests, the preponderance 
test is justified, on the economic view, as a cost-minimizing measure 
(with regard to the costs of error in particular) ; Posner makes this 
point slightly more explicit in another work of his,<9) Surprisingly, 
perhaps, conventional writers appear to agree with this view, at least 
in part; the language of "cost-minimization" might be foreign to them, 
but the idea is reflected in McCormick's observation, quoted above, 
that "in a civil case a mistaken judgment for the plaintiff is no worse 
than a mistaken judgment for the defendant," By the presumption of 
equal error costs in either direction, the correct approach in terms of 
minimizing those costs appears to be a standard of proof favoring 
neither side while still serving the necessary function of resolving 
cases where the mind of the factfinder is in equipoise, The 
preponderance test is precisely such a standard, 
Why should cases be resolved in favor of the defendant when the 
factfinder is in equipoise? Here it is difficult to judge the degree 
of agreement between the economic and the conventional views, Posner's 
answer is straightforwardly concerned with efficiency: "since no 
allocative purpose would be served by shifting a loss in a case where 
the defendant's liability was indeterminate, the rule [placing the risk 
(8) R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 432 (2d ed,)
C9) R, Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judi-
cial Administration, J, Legal Studies 388, 408-10 ( ) ,  
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of nonpersuasion of the plaintiff) economizes on litigation 
expenditures,uClO) Or, as he puts it elsewhere, "an error in 
plaintiff's favor involves a cost not incurred when the error goes the 
other way--the cost of actually collecting a legal judgment. uCll)
Perhaps conventional analysts like McCormick mean much the same 
thing as this when they say that the "burdens of pleading and proof 
with regard to most facts have been and should be assigned to the 
plaintiff who generally seeks to change the present state of affairs 
and who therefore naturally should be expected to bear the risk of 
failure of proof or persuasion, 11(12) Other factors conventionally 
mentioned as bearing on allocation of the risk of nonpersuasion are 
obscure "policies" of various sorts-handicapping disfavored 
contentions, convenience in following the natural order of 
storytelling, consideration of which party has readier access to 
knowledge about the fact in question, consideration of the extent to 
which a party's contention departs from what would be expected in the 
course of ordinary experience (the more unusual your claim, the more 
likely .YQ!!. will have to prove it) , and, finally, a catchall of 
11fairness,11Cl3) Each of these factors could be construed as consistent
with the economic view, or inconsistent, Their obscurity defies 
generalization along these lines, as does the fact that none of the 
(lO) Id at 408, 
(ll) R. Posner, sw.pra note 8 at 433, 
(12) McCormick, l!Qpra note 2, 
(l3) Id, at 786-89, 
337 at 786 (emphasis added) , 
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factors governs regularly, James and Hazard conclude that "[t]here is 
no satisfactory test for allocating the burden of proof , , ,11<14> 
Posner (and we along with him) would argue that there is�if the 
objective is cost-minimization, 
III. Points .!!. �
It appears to us that there are several confusions in the 
conventional wisdom concerning the preponderance test and expected cost 
minimization, We begin by setting out four points, The first is not 
in itself a confusion, but leads to a problem in interpretation, We 
believe, however, that the next three contain erroneous statements, 
Further, we believe that disentangling the latter three confusions will 
suggest a new, and more economically sound, ·interpretation of the 
preponderance test. 
First, (Point A) both McCormick and Posner provide a fairly 
clear definition of the preponderance standard itself, In the 
reference marked (A) Posner states that the preponderance test "directs 
the trier of facts to find in favor of the party who has the burden of 
proof on an issue if that party's version of the disputed facts is more 
probably true than the other party's version. 11(15) However, it is not
altogether clear what this definition means when the 11fact11 is a 
disputed probability, The difficulty here is not so much in the 
definition but in its application to probabilities of probabilities, 
(14) F. James and G. Hazard, Civil Procedure 7.8 at 249. 
(l5) McCormick, cited on note 6, says much the same thing, See 
BAJ! , also Oregon 
11  
Second, (Point B)  Posner states "that of the cases decided 
erroneously, about half will be won by undeserving plaintiffs and about 
half lost by deserving plaintiffs," 
Third, (Point C) both McCormick (note 7) and Posner state that 
the costs of the two types of error are about the same, 
Fourth, (Point D) Posner states that a necessary condition for 
the preponderance test to be economically sound (we take this to mean 
minimizing expected cost), the costs of the two types of error must be 
about the same, 
In our argument that the last three statements are erroneous, 
we shall develop our own interpretation of the preponderance test, one 
based on the criterion of expected cost minimization, In doing so, we 
do not wish to suggest that this interpretation, or other standards of 
proof, can (or should!) be applied as precisely or elegantly in 
practice as it can be discussed in principle, As James and Hazard 
observe in a slightly different context, burden of proof tests 
"formulated in terms that suggest objective, scientific precision" are 
in fact not really precise or confining at all. �6) Still, the different 
standards regarding the required degree of conviction of the part of a 
decisionmaker "probably suffice" to create "a frame of mind to resist 
persuasion" to a roughly appropriate extent, "and it is doubtful 
whether anything more can be done where a difference in degree is 
sought in dealing with factors so subjective and imponderable,11
�7) 
(16) Id, 
(l7) Id,
7 . 11 at 27 3-73. 
7.6 at 245. 
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IV , .fu?.£.itl !l2!..t!1.. 
The key to our argument lies in the distinction between the 
private costs in a single negligence case and the social costs 
associated with a particular standard of proof, The distinction is 
easiest to draw in terms of a specific example, 
Suppose a woman takes an anti-nausea drug during pregnancy, and 
her child is born without arms. She believes that the drug was 
teratogenic and sues the drug manufacturer for $1 million, To make 
matters simple, let us assume that the defendant stipulates that $1 
million is a good estimate of the pain and suffering, lost income, etc, 
associated with the teratogenic effect, but argues that its drug was 
not the cause of the effect, 
If the plaintiff is deserving, but liability is not found, the 
private cost of this judicial error is $1 million to the plaintiff, If 
the plaintiff is undeserving, but liability is found, the private cost 
of this judicial error is $1 million to the defendant, Thus it would 
seem that the costs of the two types of error are the same as affirmed 
by McCormick and Posner, 
However, these error costs have to do with a private transfer, 
which may or may not occur between the defendant and the plaintiff, 
They relate to a decision already made (the decision to produce and 
market the drug) and a harm already sustained, As such these error 
costs have little to do with economic efficiency or cost minimization, 
Economic efficiency focuses upon the consequences of future decisions 
which are affected by the precedent in today's particular case, 
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Suppose that liability is found in this particular case. Then 
there will be an incentive for manufacturers to not produce or restrict 
drugs in future but otherwise similar situations, where the evidence of 
toxicity is equally strong and the costs and benefits are about the 
same as they are in the case at hand, If liability is found for the 
particular case at hand, then society is likely to forego the benefits 
of drugs with similar benefits and risks in the future, 
Suppose that liability is not found in this particular case, 
Then there will be an incentive for manufacturers to produce drugs in 
future but otherwise similar situations, where the evidence of toxicity 
is equally strong and the costs and benefits are about the same as they 
are in the case at hand, If liability is not found for the particular 
case at hand, then society is likely to bear the risks of drugs with 
similar benefits and risks in the future, 
In our particular case we have so far identified a single 
victim with a cost of $1 million, the cost which may or may not have 
been caused by the drug, This $1 million, is, however, only part of 
the relevant cost comparison for cost minimization. There may be 1000 
or 10, 000 other victims and this number is also relevant for a decision 
which attempts to minimize social costs, To be concrete, let us 
suppose that in the particular example, and in similar cases, there are 
an estimated 1000 victims, each suffering $1 million in damages, for a 
total cost of $1 billion, We will call this total cost C, 
On the other side of the ledger, the chemical conveys benefits 
in the form of relief from nausea, Let us suppose that 10 million 
women take the drug, and the relief from nausea is valued at $30 over 
14 
and above the manufacturing, distribution, and retailing costs of the 
drug.<18) The total benefit � net production cost � is $30 times 10 
million or $300 million. We will call this total net social benefit B. 
This $300 million is also what Hand called the avoidance cost. 
If liability is found in this case, then in similar ones, manufacturers 
can avoid the risk of teratogenicity by not manufacturing the similarly 
suspected drugs. The cost of such avoidance is net social benefit 
foregone � the $300 million. The costs of manufacturing, distribution 
and retailing are transfers which are netted out in the analysis of net 
social cost minimization, 
We are now ready to consider the expected cost minimizing 
standard of proof. Suppose that the court weighs the evidence brought 
forward by both plaintiff and defendant and concludes that the 
probability of teratogenicity is p. If the court finds liability, it 
knows that in this case and in similar cases drugs will not be 
manufactured, For each such situation there will be no benefits, but 
at the same time no toxic effects of the drugs, With the zero net 
benefit from non-manufacture as the benchmark, we can compare the 
effects of the other possible decision, a finding of non-liability, 
With a finding of non-liability in this case, in similar situations 
drugs will be manufactured, For such cases the benefit is B and the 
expected cost is pC, When pC is greater than B there are net expected 
(l9) It might cost a woman $20 for the prescription, but she ob­
tains nausea relief which she values at $50, This $30 of net 
benefit is also valued as the benefit over and above the next 
beet alternative treatment for the nausea, 
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costs of manufacturing and society will minimize future costs by future 
precautionary decisions of non-manufacture. This is achieved by 
sending the signal of a finding of liability in the case at hand. When 
pC is less than B there are net expected benefits for the drugs and, 
compared with the zero benefit benchmark of non-manufacture, society 
will do better with the non-precautionary decision encouraging 
manufacture. This is achieved by sending the signal of finding no 
liability in the case at hand, 
Note that pC is greater than B just when p is greater than B/C, 
Thus our cost-minimizing standard of proof tells us to find liability 
when the court decides that the probability of teratogenicity is 
greater than B/C and to find no liability when the probability is less 
than B/C, This standard of proof is the same as that proposed by 
Learned Hand, with the language recast in terms of toxic torts: 
negligence exists where the cost of the toxicity multiplied by the 
probability that the chemical is toxic, exceeds the benefits of the 
chemical (or the avoidance costs of the manufacturer) , 
For the particular case at hand B is $300, 000,000 and C is 
$1, 000, 000, 000. Thus B/C is 0,3 and the cost minimizing standard of 
proof is to find liability if the court concludes that the probability 
of teratogenicity is greater than 0,3, Let us restate the matter --
the costs being minimized are not those of the present case at band, 
For this case, the decision to manufacture is already taken and the 
injury (whether or not caused by the drug) already sustained, The 
costs to be minimized are those associated with future decisions of 
whether or not to manufacture drugs with similar benefits and similar 
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suspicion of toxic risk, Note that "similar" need not be restricted to 
situations where B is $300 million and C is $1 billion, The standard 
of proof of 0,3 applies for any situation where the L!!.!2, of B to C is 
0,3, In other words the precedent of the 0. 3 standard of proof in this 
case should apply to all future cases where the ratio of B to C is 0,3, 
The error costs, from the social point of view, are identified 
as follows. If liability is found when in fact the chemical is non-
toxic, the chemical is erroneously withdrawn from the market and its 
benefits erroneously foregone. We will call this type of judicial 
error a false positive. The cost of this false positive is B, or $300 
million in the example, If liability is not found when it is 
appropriate, and the chemical is toxic, the chemical is erroneously 
left on the market,(19) The toxicity costs are borne, but its benefits 
are obtained as well. We will call this type of judicial error a false 
negative, The cost of this false negative is C-B, or $700 million in 
the example, 
As can be seen by the example, when the relevant costs of error 
are identified -- the social costs in similar problems � the costs of 
the two types of error are not in general equal, They are only equal 
when C happens to be twice B, a circumstance which must be viewed as 
exceptional, This is our argument against Point C, 
(l9) Note that if B is greater than C the cost min1m1z1ng deci­
sion is not to find liability even if it is known for sure that 
the drug is teratogenic, Thus it is possible for it to be ap­
propriate not to find liability for a teratogen and for there to 
be no judicial error, 
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It is important to observe that minimizing expected costs of 
future decisions which are affected by the precedent of the case at 
hand comes to the same thing as minimizing the expected error costs in 
the case at hand. Recall that the cost of a false positive is B and 
the cost of a false negative is C-B, and the court's evaluation of the 
probability of toxicity is p. If the court finds liability, it risks 
the possible error of a false positive. Since the court's evaluation 
of the probability of teratogenicity is p, its probability of non­
teratogenicity is (1-p) , and if the court finds liability the expected 
cost of a false positive is (1-p)B, If the court does not find 
liability, it risks the possible error of a false negative, and the 
expected cost of this error is (p) (C-B) , To minimize the expected cost 
of error the court should find liability when the expected cost of a 
false negative is larger than the expected cost of a false positive 
(when (p) (C-B) > (1-p) (B) ) ;  and choose to find no liability when the 
expected cost of a false positive is greater than the expected cost of 
a false negative, But (p) (C-B) > (1-p) (B) exactly when p > B/C, so the 
two criteria boil down to the same thing, 
We return to our cost minimizing standard of proof: find 
liability when the court finds the probability of teratogenicity to be 
greater than B/C, In the exceptional circumstance when the social 
error costs are equal, we have C - B • B or C • 2B, and the cost 
minimizing standard becomes: find liability when the court finds the 
probability of teratogenicity to be greater than B/2B or 1/2. This of 
course is the preponderance test applied to two conflicting factual 
claims the plaintiff claiming that the drug is a teratogen and the 
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defendant claiming that the drug is not a teratogen, If the only 
contested fact is whether or not the drug is a teratogen, and the court 
decides that the plaintiff's version of the fact is more likely true 
than not, the court's standard of proof is p > 1/2, 
It is not altogether clear why Posner and McCormick concluded 
that in general the error costs are equal, nor is it clear why Posner 
believed that the error costs must be equal for the preponderance test 
to be "economically sound, "  However, the above analysis suggests a 
possible explanation for these views. It is easy to confuse the 
relevant social costs of errors with the private costs of transfers 
between defendant and plaintiff, Since the private error costs are 
equal (both $1 million in the example) , this confusion explains the 
assertion that the relevant error costs -- the social error costs -­
are equal, Once it is believed that the error costs are equal, it is 
easy to interpret the preponderance test as saying "find liability when 
the court concludes that it is more likely than not that the chemical 
is toxic (p > B/C or p > 1/2) , 11 And once we have this interpretation of 
the preponderance test, it is easy to conclude that a necessary 
condition for the preponderance test to be cost minimizing is for the 
error costs to be the same. 
We are suggesting that this whole rationale unravels once the 
proper distinction between private and social costs is made. Once 
made, it is seen that the relevant error costs are not in general the 
same and that the cost minimizing standard of proof is p > B/C. But 
what about the preponderance test? Our distinction between private and 
social costs leaves open the question of how to interpret the 
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preponderance test and relate it to cost minimization. 
V. Probabilities of Probabilities 
There are several ways of interpreting the preponderance test. 
In the example, the plaintiff might assert as a fact that the drug is a 
teratogen and the defendant might assert as a fact that the drug is not 
a teratogen. Suppose that the court finds that the weight of evidence 
on either side is nearly balanced but that the defendant's version is 
slightly more credible than the plaintiff's. An obvious interpretation 
of the preponderance test would be for the court to conclude that since 
the defendant's version is more probable than the plaintiff's, there 
should be no liability, 
But this interpretation is inconsistent with cost minimization. 
Suppose, for example, in concluding that the evidence from both sides 
is almost balanced but slightly favors the defendant, the court decides 
the probability that the drug is teratogenic is about 0.45. Since 0.45 
is greater than 0,30, we know for expected cost minimization the 
appropriate precedent to set is to find liability in the case at hand, 
Leading toward another interpretation of the preponderance 
test, we return to the example but suppose that neither side claims 
certainty, Instead of claiming that she knows!.!!.!.!. fact that the drug 
is a teratogen, the plaintiff argues that the evidence points toward a 
conclusion that the drug is a teratogen, She argues that, although 
there are still some scientific doubts, a reasonable person would 
conclude there is an 80 percent probability that the drug is a 
teratogen, The defendant does not claim .!1!.!. fact that the drug is not 
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a teratogen, The defendant admits that there is some evidence which 
suggests a slight probability of teratogenicity, According to the 
defendant, a reasonable person would conclude that there is only a 20 
percent chance of teratogenicity, Again we will assume that the court 
finds the arguments supporting these conflicting probabilistic 
evaluations to be almost equally balanced, but again with the 
defendant's argument slightly more credible, Here the defendant's 
version of the "facts" is that the evidence of toxicity leads a 
reasonable person to conclude the probability is 20 percent, The 
plaintiff's version of the facts is that the evidence leads a 
reasonable person to conclude the probability is 80 percent, 
A second interpretation of the preponderance test would be to 
decide that since the court found the defendant's version to be more 
probable, the court should accept the defendant's version, Thus the 
court would conclude that the probability of teratogenicity is 20 
percent, Since 0,2 is less than the 0,3 required standard of proof, 
the court would find no liability, under this interpretation, 
This second interpretation of the preponderance test is also 
inconsistent with expected cost minimization, To see the inconsistency 
suppose that the court decided that the defendant's argument was twice 
as credible as the plaintiff's, To define what we mean by "twice as 
credible" we need to talk about probabilities of probabilities, or what 
are called "second order probabilities of probabilities" in decision 
theory, To say that the defendant is twice as credible as the 
plaintiff is to mean that the court assesses a .67 probability that the 
defendant is right in her probabilistic judgment, With this assessment 
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of the relative credibilities, the court forms its own judgment of the 
probability of teratogenicity by taking the weighted average 
(0,67) (0,2) + (0. 33) (0.8) • 0.4. 
This precise definition of "credibility" may be foreign to 
legal commentators, thus some further illustration may help. If the 
court found that the defendant's argument was not credible at all, but 
the plaintiff's argument was highly credible, the court would adopt the 
plaintiff's judgment of the probability of teratogenicity, 0,8; note 
(0) (0,2) + (1) (0,8) • 0.8. Similarly, in reverse, if the court found 
the plaintiff not credible at all and the defendant's judgment of 0.2; 
note (1) (0.2) + (0) (0. 8) • 0.2. More typically, in weighing the 
arguments of both sides, the court would find its judgment of the 
probability of teratogenicity to be somewhere in between the 
plaintiff's and defendant's conflicting judgments. When the court 
forms its own judgment of the probability of teratogenicity, it is 
saying something about the relative credibilities of the two parties. 
The court's own judgment can be considered a weighted average of the 
defendant's and plaintiff's judgments, where the weights are defined as 
the relative credibilities of each version. 
In our second possible interpretation of the preponderance test 
the court does not find liability, because it adopts the defendant's 
version, which is that a reasonable person would assess probability of 
teratogenicity as 0. 2, and this 0. 2 is less than the 0,3 standard of 
proof. The court adopts the defendant's version because it considers 
that the defendant's version is more credible than the plaintiff's. At 
the same time the court believes that the plaintiff hes some 
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credibility and believes that the probability of teratogenicity is 
actually a weighted average of 0.2 and 0.8. With relative 
credibilities of 0.67 and 0.33, the court assesses the probability of 
teratogenicity to be 0.4. Since this is greater than the 0.3 standard 
of proof, the cost minimizing decision is to find liability. Thus our 
second interpretation of the preponderance test is inconsistent with 
expected cost minimization, 
Having rejected two possible interpretations of the 
preponderance test, we are still looking for an interpretation which is 
consistent with expected cost minimization and has the idea of 
"something more likely than not" in it. We can get close to our 
objective by looking a little more closely at second order 
probabilities. First we assumed that the litigants asserted full 
knowledge about the toxicity of the drug, the plaintiff asserting that 
she knew for a fact that the drug is teratogenic and the defendant 
asserting that he knew for a fact that it was not. Next we assumed 
that the litigants were a little more bumble. They agreed that they 
did not know for a fact whether or not the drug is a teratogen. 
Instead each weighed the existing evidence and came up with probability 
judgments. The plaintiff argued that the probability of teratogenicity 
was, in fact, 0.8, and the defendant argued the probability was, in 
fact, 0.2. This time we will allow the litigants to be a little more 
bumble yet. 
We imagine the plaintiff's pleading as follows. She agrees 
that the evidence of toxicity is uncertain and that reasonable people 
can differ in its interpretation. She still argues that a reasonable 
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person would assess the evidence as about an 0, 8 probability of 
teratogenicity, but she admits some uncertainty as to this precise 
estimate, She expresses her uncertainty by "a judgmental probability 
distribution" (Figure la) , This judgmental probability allows the 
plaintiff to state her uncertainty about her probability estimate. �O) 
If her judgment had been very concentrated around the value of 0. 8 
(like a spike centered on 0. 8, as in Figure lb) this would mean that 
she was claiming strong knowledge in her estimate of 0. 8, If her 
judgment had been more spread out (as in Figure le) this would mean 
that she was more uncertain in her probability estimate, 
Similarly we can imagine that the defendant also admits that he 
does not know for sure (for a fact) that the probability of 
teratogenicity is only 0.2. He too, especially under cross 
examination, is willing to express some uncertainty about his 
probability estimate of 0.2. He does this in the form of his own 
judgmental probability distribution, in Figure 2. His judgment is a 
little mote spread out than the plaintiff's, because he admits to a 
little more uncertainty about his estimate, 
After weighing the evidence brought forward by the two parties, 
the court forms its own judgment as to the probability of 
teratogenicity, The court also feels some uncertainty as to its 
probability judgment, and the court expresses its uncertainty by its 
<20) The judgmental probability distribution is a second order 
probability distribution. It places probability weight on where 
the probability assessor thanks the probability of toxicity is 
located, 
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own judgmental probability distribution (Figure 3a) , As before the 
court's judgment is in between the versions of the two parties, and its 
judgment depends on the relative credibilities of the litigants, But 
this time the court expresses its uncertainty as to the precise value 
of the probability, 
By the criterion of expected cost minimization, the court 
should find liability if its assessment of the expected costs is higher 
than the benefits, But when we have framed the uncertainties in terms 
of second order probabilities, how do we assess the expected costs? 
One of the facts about second order probabilities � if one can assert 
facts in a paper on the difficulty of asserting facts about 
probabilities � is that the courts evaluation of expected cost is pC 
where pis the mean of the court's judgmental probability distribution, 
It follows that the criterion of expected cost minimization says that 
the court should find liability if the mean of its second order 
probability of toxicity is greater than 0,3, 
We have still not reached a satisfactory interpretation of the 
preponderance test, but we are now close, There is a special case 
where the mean of a probability distribution is the same as the median, 
This is the case where the distribution is symmetric, Let us consider 
this case, where p is both the mean and the median of the court's 
second order probability of teratogenicity, The median has a simple 
interpretation: half the probability weight of the distribution is to 
the right of the median and half to the left, When the median is 
greater than 0, 3, it is more likely than not, in the court's judgment, 
that the probability of teratogenicity is more than 0, 3, This 
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observation suggests a third interpretation of the preponderance test 
-- the court should find liability when it is more likely than not that 
the probability of toxicity is greater than B/C (or in the example 
0. 3) . 
This third interpretation of the preponderance test seems, to 
us, rather natural, once the difficulties of the first two are pointed 
out, However, it does not always accord with expected cost 
minimization, The condition for its consistency with expected cost 
minimization is that the mean and median, of the court's judgmental 
probability distribution, be the same, A sufficient condition for this 
is that the court's judgmental probability distribution (its second 
order distribution) be symmetric, 
Further, we can say something about when our third 
interpretation of the preponderance test is too lax in the sense of 
providing insufficient incentive for precautionary action, This 
situation arises when there is weak evidence of toxicity, but where, if 
there is toxicity, the effects are severe compared with the benefits of 
the chemical. In other words the situation is likely to arise in the 
case of the example we have been considering all along. Where B is low 
relative to C, the ratio B/C is relatively close to zero, For the case 
to be difficult. in judgment the probability of toxicity must be 
centered somewhere around B/C, as in Figure 3b, If the court has much 
uncertainty as to its assessment of the probability of toxicity -- as 
the court is likely to in such cases -- the court's judgmental 
probability distribution is likely to be spread out, It cannot spread 
far to the left and the only way it can spread, while still centering 
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around B/C is for it to be skewed to the right, as in Figure 3b, But 
in this situation the mean is larger than the median. Thus it is 
possible for the court to find that it is more likely than not that the 
probability of toxicity is less than B/C (and thus find no liability 
under our interpretation) , yet at the same time for the mean to be 
greater than B/C (so that there should be a finding of liability under 
the criterion of expected cost minimization) , This is the situation 
depicted in Figure 3b, 
So far we have carried forward the argument in principle, As 
James and Hazard put it much of what seems "objective, scientific 
precision" becomes less confining in practice, especially where 
numerical quantification is not attempted, The main purpose of the 
above reasoning is to see how the ideas fit together � or how they do 
not, If successful, the exercise leads to a "frame of mind" which 
helps untangle vague and sometimes erroneous qualitative arguments. 
In practice we have to choose between two cumbersome criteria, 
(1) Require liability if the court decides that it is more likely than 
not that the probability of toxicity is greater than B/C; and (2) 
Require liability if the court finds that the mean of its judgmental 
probability distribution is greater than B/C, The latter is consistent 
with expected cost minimization, But the former appears a little less 
cumbersome a little easier to grasp, What the former loses in 
principle it may more than make up for in concreteness and 
implementability, Nonetheless, it is useful to know that there appears 
to be some (slight) bias toward laxness, when the risks are high 
relative to the benefits, and a bias the other way when the risks are 
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ems re at1ve to t e enef1ts. 
The above argument leads to an interpretation of the 
preponderance test which appears to be at least somewhat different from 
Posner's. It also leads to conditions when the interpretation is 
"economically sound" which are definitely different from Posner's. 
In this frame of mind judgmental probabilities are not "true" 
or "false" - they are not objective facts in that sense, Instead the 
plaintiff's 0. 8 probability is her evaluation of the likelihood of 
toxicity; the defendant's 0,2 is hie evaluation; and the 0,4 is the 
court's evaluation based on the arguments brought forward, All three 
are judgments. When the court comes out closer to the defendant's 
version of the probability, this does not mean that the defendant's 
precise number 0. 2 has the status of an objective fact which is taken 
to the "true" or "accurate," it simply means that the court finds the 
defendant's argument more weighty in the sense that the court's 
judgment comes out closer to the defendant's than to the plaintiff's, 
There are some facts, however. It is a fact that the plaintiff's 
probability is 0,8, another that the plaintiff's evaluation is 0,2, and 
a third that the court's judgment is 0,4, It is also a fact that each 
of these evaluations are uncertain, and the second order probabilities 
express these uncertainties, 
VI. The Ratio of Judicial lli2U 
(2l) The likely cutoff in bias is where B/C=l/2, 
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Posner states "that of the cases decided erroneously, about 
half will be won by undeserving plaintiffs and about half lost by 
deserving plaintiffs. " Here we will suggest that the numbers of the 
two types of errors are not in general about the same. The ratio of 
the two types of errors - the ratio of false positive to false 
negatives in our terms - depends on several circumstances, One 
circumstance is the standard of proof for the similar cases being 
considered together, B/C, Another circumstance is the strength of 
evidence brought forward, 
Consider, as in our example, a 1000 cases which are similar in 
that for each B/C • 0,3, Let us suppose that in 300 cases weak 
evidence of toxicity is brought forward and the court concludes, after 
weighing arguments from both sides that the probability of toxicity is 
only 0.1; in 500 cases suggestive evidence is brought forward and the 
court concludes the probability of toxicity is 0.4; and in 200 cases 
strong evidence is brought forward and the court concludes the 
probability of toxicity is o.a. 
Under the criterion of expected cost minimization, liability is 
found for the cases where strong and moderate evidence is brought 
forward, (since for these 700 cases the p > 0, 3) ,  but not for the cases 
of weak evidence. In the 300 cases for which no liability is found, 
the court expects some false negatives, namely 10 percent of the 300 or 
30 false negatives, In the 500 cases where there is suggestive 
evidence, and liability found, there will be some false positives, For 
these cases the court found only a 0,4 probability of toxicity, or a 
0. 6 probability of non-toxicity. Thus the court's expectation is that
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60 percent of the 500, or 300 cases, will be false positives, And in 
the 200 cases where strong evidence is brought forward and liability 
found, there will be additional false positives, Here the court found 
an 0,8 probability of toxicity, or a 0.2 probability of non-toxicity, 
Hence the court's expectation of the number of false positives for this 
group of 200 cases is 40 false positives, Altogether, under the 
criterion of cost minimization, the court expects 30 false negatives 
and 340 false positives, The ratio of false positives to false 
negatives is 340 to 30, far different from the 1 to 1 ratio posited by 
Posner (Point B) . 
VII, Conclusion 
In this paper we have suggested, contrary to Posner, that under 
a criterion of expected cost minimization, judicial error costs are not 
in general the same, the number of erroneous judgments favoring 
undeserving plaintiffs is not likely to be the same as the number of 
erroneous judgments favoring undeserving defendants, and equality of 
the two error costs is not a necessary condition for the preponderance 
test to be "economically sound," In developing our interpretation of 
the preponderance test, we explored three possible interpretations, 
rejecting the first two as inconsistent with economic efficiency, The 
third as well is not, in general, consistent with economic efficiency 
either, but it comes much closer than the others, Moreover, when the 
practical problems of administration are taken into account, this third 
interpretation of the preponderance test may come closer to minmizing 
costs than other operational rules a court might attempt to follow. 
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This third interpretation of the preponderance test is derived 
in terms of second order probabilities, or probabilities of 
probabilities, Under this interpretation the court finds liability 
when it decides that it is more likely than not that the probability of 
toxicity is greater than B/C, This interpretation is close, but not in 
general quite the same, as the criterion which is consistent with 
economic efficiency -- the court should find liability when it decides 
that the mean of its second order probability distribution is greater 
than B/C, While this latter criterion will be foreign to many, 
fortunately second order probabilities resolve themselves into simple 
first order probabilities, For the court to decide that the mean of 
its second order probability distribution is greater than B/C boils 
down to the court deciding that the probability of toxicity is greater 
than B/C, The only difference is that with the second order 
probabilities the court can express its uncertainties in its assessment 
of the probability of toxicity. 
The latter criterion (that the court find liability if it 
decides that the mean of its second order probability distribution is 
greater than B/C) is consistent with economic efficiency but it is 
cumbersome, The former criterion (that the court find liability if it 
decides that it is more likely than not that the probability of 
toxicity is greater than B/C) has the notion of preponderance in it 
(the notion of more likely than not) . The latter criterion is not 
quite consistent with economic efficiency, but it is easy to state the 
condition when it is, The condition is for the mean and the median of 
the second order distribution to be the same, In practice they are 
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likely to be close. However, for cases where there are presumed small 
probabilities of severe harms, there is likely to be some bias toward 
too little precaution in our interpretation of the preponderance test, 
compared with economic efficiency; and some bias toward over-precaution 
for cases where there are presumed high probabilities of toxicity but 
relatively unsevere effects. 
The difficulties in dealing with uncertain probabilities, or 
probabilities of probabilities, are real. It is not surprising that 
there are occasionally confusions with this subject � we hope that we 
have resolved more confusion than we have added. The language of 
second order probabilities, or probabilities of probabilities, is 
useful in providing a frame of reference and syntax for the various 
probabilities which appear in legal decision making. Hopefully such a 
language and syntax may prevent such gross confusion as that evidence 
by the 8th courtin the Reserve Mining Case. There, the court claimed 
that the lower court had resolved "all" the uncertaiinties in favor of 
the plaintiffs, To improve matters the court resolved all the 
uncertainties in favor of the defendant, The language of probabilities 
provides a means for making decisions consistent with expected cost 
minimization, without "throwing" the very real uncertainties all to one 
side or the other, 
Once familiar with the language and syntax, it can be seen that 
our interpretation of the preponderance test is a kind of stop gap, 
Once the court becomes familiar with the meaning of criterion ''more 
likely than not that the probability of toxicity is greater than B/C11 
it may have greater ease in assessing its first order probabilities. 
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In doing so, it can move directly to the criterion "find liability if 
the probability of toxicity is greater than B/C" at the same time 
knowing that its assessment of this first order probability is, in 
itself, uncertain. This latter criterion has the advantages of 
simplicity, consistency with economic efficiency, and direct lineage 
with Learned Hand's formula. 
